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BAYESIAN LEARNING IN DYNAMIC NON-ATOMIC
ROUTING GAMES
EMILIEN MACAULT‡, MARCO SCARSINI¶, AND TRISTAN TOMALA§
Abstract. We consider a discrete-time nonatomic routing game
with variable demand and uncertain costs. Given a fixed rout-
ing network with single origin and destination, the costs functions
on edges depend on some uncertain persistent state parameter.
Every period, a variable traffic demand routes through the net-
work. The experienced costs are publicly observed and the be-
lief about the state parameter is Bayesianly updated. This paper
studies the dynamics of equilibrium and beliefs. We say that there
is strong learning when beliefs converge to the truth and there
is weak learning when equilibrium flows converge to those under
complete information. Our main result is a characterization of the
networks for which learning occurs for all increasing cost functions,
given highly variable demand. We prove that these networks have
a series-parallel structure and provide a counterexample to prove
that the condition is necessary.
Keywords. Routing Games; Incomplete Information; Social Learn-
ing.
1. Introduction
The market for navigation systems has settled as one of the biggest
among the ICT, both in its number of users and its revenues. The
competition between providers is driven by their respective reliability
that is, the quality of their data. A majority of current navigation sys-
tems rely on real-time ETA to offer the most efficient path. To do so,
they combine users’ data streams to compute the level of congestion on
each road in the routing network. While this may be a reliable system
for heavily used roads, it is unclear whether decentralized equilibrium
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dynamics provide a sufficient level of exploration of the whole network.
Indeed, two mechanics are at play in this setup. First, the entan-
gled relationship between equilibrium actions and information inflow,
characterized as the feedback effect : agents’ choices generate new infor-
mation, which will influence equilibrium behavior in the next periods.
Second, routing frameworks usually aim at modeling a vast number of
agents that is, belong to the class of large games. Arbitrarily large
player sets are approximated by continua of agents which are known to
show myopic behavior in repeated settings. The conjunction of these
two effects – endogenous information acquisition and myopic behavior
– may prevent agents from exploring their whole action sets and leave
optimal paths unidentified.
1.1. Our Contribution. In this work, we regard navigation systems
as non-strategic providers of information who aggregate and broadcast
collected data. Thus, all the available information is public and there
is a single public belief. Our objective is to characterize the situations
where decentralized behavior actually aggregates information. We con-
sider a dynamic nonatomic routing game with variable demand and in-
complete information: for each edge of the network, the cost function
depends on the load and on an unknown persistent state parameter.
At each stage, a traffic demand of variable mass routes through the
network. Total mass and costs experienced are publicly observed and
the public belief is updated from Bayes rule. This defines formally
a discrete-time nonatomic routing game with incomplete information,
which encompasses static Bayesian routing games and repeated routing
games. We model the demand as sequences of short-lived populations1.
We define two concepts of learning, strong and weak, depending on
whether the public belief converges to a full mass on the true state
of the world, or equilibrium flows converge to those under complete
information. In each period, given the public belief, an equilibrium flow
routes through the network, generating information about costs and
thus updating of the public belief. We study the asymptotic behavior
of the joint dynamics of flows and beliefs. These dynamics converge to
a steady state where equilibrium flows do not lead to belief revision.
This does not imply belief accuracy, some paths may remain unexplored
and unused. Since agents behave myopically, they have no incentive
to explore paths which are not optimal under the current belief. The
1This is arguably done without loss of generality. A general property of dynamic
games with nonatomic players is that the dynamic equilibrium behavior is myopic.
Since each agent is negligible, one individual choice is irrelevant to others. Thus,
there is no “Folk Theorem” effect and agents optimize myopically (cf. [10]).
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example in Section 3 shows that this situation may occur in a simple
case with two edges and affine cost functions.
In our model the traffic demand is random and varies over time. As
a result, equilibrium flow evolve according to beliefs and to demand.
Our main result is a characterization of the networks for which (weak
or strong) learning occurs for all continuous increasing and unbounded
cost functions. These are the series-parallel (SP) networks. For such
a network, when the demand can reach high enough levels and costs
functions are unbounded, equilibrium flows eventually coincide of with
full information flows. Further, if the demand distribution has full sup-
port, then the beliefs converge almost surely to full knowledge. How-
ever, when the SP condition is no met, we can find unbounded costs
functions for which learning fails, irrespective of the demand distribu-
tion.
1.2. Literature. The study of nonatomic routing games originates
with [26] where the concept of Wardrop equilibrium was introduced.
More recently, routing games have become a natural application in al-
gorithmic learning. The main reason for this is the connection between
congestion games and potential games. [25] proved that any congestion
game admits a potential function, whose minimizers correspond to the
equilibria of the game. Conversely, [22] proved that for any potential
game, there exists a congestion game with the same potential function.
Under strict monotonicity of cost functions, the potential function of
any congestion game is strictly convex, hence the relevance of online
algorithms to solve those games.
In [8], the authors provide a regularized algorithm whose trajectories
converge to Nash equilibria for both continuous and discrete-time po-
tential games. In [18] and [11], the authors provide fast-converging al-
gorithms achieving low regret in the subclass of smooth routing games.
The main limitation to these results is the well-known property of
regret-free algorithms converging in expectation only. [6] provides a
simple instance of a routing network with two edges and linear costs
where Multiplicative Weights Updates algorithm displays chaotic be-
havior. Through this example, authors show that along a trajectory of
the learning dynamics, equilibria can be inefficient infinitely often.
Beyond algorithmic learning, work has been done in studying learn-
ing in routing games using classical game theoretic tools. Monderer
and Shapley proved convergence of fictitious play for potential games
in [21]. Early results also feature [2] where authors consider heteroge-
neously informed populations routing in a Bayesian framework. More
recent results in this direction were provided by [16]. In [9], authors
4 BAYESIAN LEARNING IN DYNAMIC NON-ATOMIC ROUTING GAMES
present an example of a routing game in which costs at equilibrium are
worse under full knowledge of the latency functions and provided an
optimal signaling structure partially revealing the state of the world.
[1] prove that a class of routing networks induce a negative value of in-
formation when cost functions are unknown. They identified this phe-
nomenon as an “informational Braess paradox” and characterized the
class of networks bearing this property. In [28], authors study a static
routing model in which several populations of agents have different be-
liefs over latencies and analyze competition between those information
structures.
All those works attempt to bridge algorithmic game theory and the
classical game theoretic learning framework, featured in [12]. While
seemingly close in their setup, canonical results from [4] and [15] cannot
be applied to this framework as the flow of information is endogenous
and influences the sequence of equilibria. Rather, the set of equilibria
we study resembles those of partial learning dynamics. [13] introduced
the concept of self-confirming equilibrium, which corresponds to equi-
libria where each player holds beliefs about her opponents plays and
best-responds myopically. Along the path of plays, players are cor-
rect although they may hold wrong beliefs on off-path events. Closer
to our results is the concept of conjectural equilibrium as defined in
[3]. These equilibria correspond to limit points of learning dynamics in
games with incomplete information that satisfy two properties: they
consist in a pair of belief and action profiles such that agents play a
Nash equilibrium for their belief, and the induced equilibrium does
not contradict agents’ beliefs. We show that in routing games with
incomplete information, a similar behavior occurs when the game is
repeated.
There exist two main approaches to solving our main problem, which
differ in the strategic nature of the information system. The first ap-
proach consists in assimilating the system to a principal, using his
information to correct agents’ incentives. In fact, most existing navi-
gation systems send recommandations to have users explore unknown
paths with a small probability. This augments the available informa-
tion at the cost of reducing the perceived reliability for those users.
This trade-off is studied in a dynamic mechanism design framework in
[17]. In [19], authors study the effect of a central planner using dy-
namic information provision in routing games with a Markovian state.
Rather, our approach considers the navigation system as non-strategic,
its role being limited to aggregating information only. In this direction,
the closest reference to our work is [27], where authors adopt a similar
framework: they consider a repeated nonatomic routing game with a
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public information system. The major difference between their work
and ours is their focusing on noisy observations to establish conditions
ensuring learning. Rather, we exploit demand volatility to the same
end, and establish different and more precise conditions.
1.3. Outline. In Section 2, we define the dynamic model of routing
games with incomplete information and the concepts of social learning
we consider. In Section 3, we present a simple example where learning
fails and routing is inefficient. In Section 4, we present our main results.
We first study joint convergence of beliefs and equilibria. We then
introduce SP networks then state our main results. In Section 5, We
detail the proofs of those results and provide counter examples, when
the conditions of the theorem are not satisfied.
2. The Model
2.1. Routing Games with Incomplete Information.
2.1.1. Canonical Routing Framework. A nonatomic routing game G is
defined by a tuple (d,N , (ce)e∈E). A positive real number d represents
the traffic demand. N = (V,E) is a directed multigraph with vertex
set V and edge set E. A pair (O,D) of nodes in V represent an origin
and a destination. The strategy set is the set R ⊆ 2E of simple paths
connecting O to D. Each edge e ∈ E is associated with a continuous
and non-decreasing cost function ce : R
+ → R+.
When a demand mass d routes over N , it generates a non-negative
flow x = (xr)r∈R. A flow is said to be feasible if
∑
r∈R xr = d. For
each resource e ∈ E, a flow on paths generates a load le =
∑
r∋e xr.
The cost of using edge e is then ce(le) and the total cost of path r is
the sum of costs on its edges cr(x) =
∑
e∈r ce(le).
A feasible flow x∗ ∈ (R+)|R| is a Wardrop equilibrium for G =
(d,N , (ce)e∈E) if
∀r, r′ ∈ R, x∗r > 0⇒ cr (x
∗) ≤ cr′ (x
∗) .
2.1.2. Routing with Incomplete Information. We consider routing games
with incomplete information in the following sense: a state of the world
θ is initially drawn at random from a finite state space Θ according to
a publicly known distribution µ ∈ ∆(Θ). For all e ∈ E, the latency
of edge e is a function ce : R
+ × Θ → R+ which is continuous and
non-decreasing in its first argument. A static nonatomic routing game
with incomplete information is then a tuple ((d,N , (ce)e∈E),Θ, µ). For
a fixed network and costs, this game only depends on the demand d
and the belief, which is why we shorten it by G(d, µ).
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As a solution concept, we consider Wardrop equilibria of the game
with expected costs under µ. This corresponds to Bayes-Wardrop equi-
libria (BWE) as defined in [28] where information is public.
Definition 1. A feasible flow x∗ ∈ R|R| is a Bayes-Wardrop equilibrium
for G (d, µ) if
∀r, r′ ∈ R, x∗r > 0⇒ Eµ [cr (x
∗, θ)] ≤ Eµ [cr′ (x
∗, θ)] .
For the rest of the paper, we let W(d, µ) be the set of BWE for a
demand d and a belief µ. The equilibrium edge load vectors correspon-
dence is denoted by L(d, µ).
2.2. Learning in the Dynamic Game.
2.2.1. Framework. Consider an i.i.d. sequence (dt)t∈N of random vari-
ables in R+ with common distribution F . The distributions µ0 of the
state and of this i.i.d. sequence induce a unique probability distribution
P on Ω = Θ× (R+)N
∗
endowed with the product σ-algebra. Before the
game starts, a state θ is drawn once and for all according to µ0 ∈ ∆(Θ).
We denote θ˜(ω) the corresponding random variable.
Time is discrete and at stage t = 0, the demand d0 is realized and
the nonatomic routing game with incomplete information G(d0, µ0) is
played. This generates an equilibrium flow x0 ∈ W(d0, µ0) and a load
profile l0. Then the load profile and realized costs on each used edge
are publicly observed and the public belief µ0 is updated to µ1 with
µ1(θ) = P
(
θ˜(ω) = θ | µ0, l0, (ce(l0, θ˜(ω)))e∈E
)
for all θ ∈ Θ. Then a
new instance of the game is played with demand size d1 and belief
µ1 and so on. At stage t, the demand generates an equilibrium xt ∈
W(dt, µt) with realized load profile lt. The equilibrium selection is
assumed to be measurable. At any stage t, a history of the game ht is
a collection of observations of past plays,
ht = (d0, l0, (ce(l0, θ˜(ω)))e∈E, . . . , (ce(lt−1, µt−1), θ˜(ω)))e∈E, dt).
For every θ ∈ Θ and history ht, the posterior belief µt ∈ ∆(Θ) is the
conditional distribution of the realized state θ˜(ω), given the current
history ht,
∀θ, µt(θ) = P(θ˜(ω) = θ | ht).
This defines a dynamic nonatomic routing game with incomplete infor-
mation denoted Γ = ((N , (ce)e∈E,Θ, µ0, F )
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2.2.2. Social Learning in the Dynamic Game. The main objective of
our paper is to assess the effects of equilibrium dynamics on information
aggregation. More precisely, we’re interested in observing whether in
the long run, beliefs approach the truth.
The sequence of beliefs is a martingale for the filtration induced
by histories and converges almost surely to some limit µ∞, by the
martingale convergence theorem. As the next section illustrates, this
limit belief need not be the truth. We distinguish between two cases
formalized in the following definition. Let δθ be the Dirac mass on θ
and Pθ(·) = P(· | θ˜(ω) = θ).
Definition 2. In a dynamic nonatomic congestion game with incom-
plete information, we say that
(a) there is strong learning if for every realized state θ, µt(θ) con-
verges to δθ, Pθ-almost surely;
(b) there is weak learning if for any realized state θ, W(·, µ∞) ⊆
W(·, δθ), Pθ-almost surely.
Note that learning in the strong sense implies learning in the weak
sense but the converse may not be true. For instance, consider two
functions c(·, θ) and c(·, θ′) induced by two different states θ, θ′ which
are equal at all points in the support of the demand but different else-
where. Then, even if θ and θ′ may be indistinguishable asymptotically,
i.e., {θ, θ′} ⊆ supp(µ∞), demand is routed as under full information
since weak learning implies:
W(·, µ∞) ⊆ W(·, δθ) ∩W(·, δθ′).
3. Pigou network
We present a simple example that highlights how learning may fail. It
is based on the famous example introduced in [23]. A similar example,
applied to information design, can be found in [9]. Consider a parallel
routing network with two paths connecting a single origin-destination
pair. The lower path has a cost c2(l) = l. The upper path has a cost
determined by the state of nature which can be either good (g) in which
case c1(l, g) = l or bad (b) and c1(l, b) = l + a for some real a > 0. We
call θ˜(ω) the realized state of nature.
Note that in the example, for any demand mass and belief, the equi-
librium flow is unique. The prior µ0 is assumed to put positive proba-
bility on both states b and g.
Claim 3. Learning occurs both weakly and strongly in the dynamic
game if and only if F (aµ0(b)) < 1.
8 BAYESIAN LEARNING IN DYNAMIC NON-ATOMIC ROUTING GAMES
O D
c1(l, θ)
c2(l, θ)
Figure 1. Parallel edge network.
Proof. It is sufficient that a positive mass is routed on the upper path
to fully reveal the state. Let At =
{
µt(θ˜(ω)) = 1
}
be the event that
the realized state is learnt by time t. Then,
At =
{
∃k < t, lk1 > 0
}
.
In turn, this implies that Act = {µt(b) = µ0(b)}. It is immediate that
for any realized demand mass d < aµ0(b), E [c1(0, θ)] > E [c2(l, θ)] for
any l ∈ [0, d], hence no demand will use the upper path in equilibrium
and the state remains unknown. Then, At = {∃k < t, dk > aµ0(b)}. [5]
provides the following extension of the Borel-Cantelli lemma.
Lemma 4 ([5, Lemma 1]). Given a probability space (Ω,Σ,P) and an
increasing sequence of events (At)t, we have P(At, infinitely often) = 1
if and only if there exists a strictly increasing sequence (tk) of positive
integers such that ∑
k
P(Atk | A
c
tk−1
) = +∞.
From this result, as (At)t≥0 is an increasing sequence of events and
the sequence (dt)t≥0 is i.i.d., we get,∑
t≥0
P(At | A
c
t−1) =
∑
t≥0
(1− F (aµ0(b))).
As the summands are all equal and constant, there exist a subsequence
of time indices (tk) for which the series of probabilities diverges if and
only if the full series diverge, hence learning occurs in the dynamic
game if and only if F (aµ0(b)) < 1 which proves our result. 
With this example, we observe that learning may fail in very simple
cases. For instance, if the demand is identically 1 and a = 2, then for
any prior belief µ0(b) > 1/2 the realized state on the upper path will
remain unknown. Conversely, if the demand can push edge-costs to be
BAYESIAN LEARNING IN DYNAMIC NON-ATOMIC ROUTING GAMES 9
“high enough” with positive probability, learning occurs almost-surely.
As the next section details, this relies on the unboundedness of the
lower-path cost function.
4. Learning in the Dynamic Game
4.1. Hypotheses. Our results will need the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. For any θ ∈ Θ and any e ∈ E, ce(·, θ) is strictly
increasing.
Under Assumption 1, for any demand mass d ∈ R and belief µ ∈
∆(Θ), the game G(d, µ) has a unique BWE load profile. Indeed, as
proved in [28], any routing game in incomplete information G(d, µ) is a
potential game. Thus, strictly increasing costs is a sufficient condition
for uniqueness of the BWE edge load profile, which will be denoted
l(d, µ) thereafter.
Next, we assume that for any pair of different states, the induced
vectors of cost functions are not identical.
Assumption 2. ∀θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, θ 6= θ′, ∃e ∈ E, ∃l ≥ 0 s.t. ce(l, θ) 6=
ce(l, θ
′).
This assumption precludes degenerate cases where two states would
yield strictly identical costs on every edge and would then be indistin-
guishable.
4.2. Convergence of Beliefs and Equilibria. A first result in our
model is that the sequence of equilibrium load profiles lt = l(·, µt)
converges to some limit function l∞ = l(·, µ∞) : R+ → (R+)
|R|
. More
precisely, we have the following:
Proposition 5. For any dynamic nonatomic routing game with incom-
plete information Γ, under Assumption 1, the sequence of equilibrium
load profiles (lt)t≥0 converges to a limit map l∞ in finite time with prob-
ability 1.
Proof. We know that the sequence of beliefs is a bounded martingale
for the filtration induced by the history of the game, hence it converges.
In addition, given a prior µ0, it can only take a finite number of val-
ues. Indeed, any information obtained upon observing realized costs
corresponds to eliminating a set of states whose induced costs are in-
compatible with the history of the game. The sequence of supports of
belief is then weakly decreasing: any change in µ in the course of the
game corresponds to a reduction in the support of µ.
∀t ≥ 0, supp (µt) = {θ ∈ Θ|µt(θ) > 0} ⊆ supp (µt−1) .
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The cardinality of the sequence of supports is then a decreasing se-
quence of integers, hence it is eventually stationary. Let T be the last
time index at which the support of the belief changes, that is,
∀t ≥ T, µt = µT .
As Θ is finite, T is finite almost surely. When strong learning oc-
curs, T is the first time index where the belief µt is a Dirac mass. By
uniqueness of the equilibrium load profile, we get,
P (∃T <∞, ∀t ≥ T, l(·, µt) = l(·, µ∞)) = 1.

4.3. Series-Parallel Networks. The key element in our results is the
interplay between the routing network structure and the combinatorial
properties of the action space. [14] and [20] isolate the set of graphs
that are immune to inefficiencies in the form of Braess’ paradox. They
correspond to the class of series-parallel (SP) graphs.
[24] show that the class of SP networks can be defined constructively:
Definition 6. A single origin-destination network N is series-parallel
if and only if either
(1) It has a single edge;
(2) Or it consists of two SP networks connected in series;
(3) Or it consists of two SP networks connected in parallel.
Definition 7. A network N is embedded in a network G if, starting
from N , G can be built by applying the following operations in any
order:
(1) Splitting an edge into two edges with a single common node;
(2) Adding an extra edge between two nodes;
(3) Adding an extra edge at the origin or the destination.
Note that a single origin-destination N graph is SP if and only if the
Wheatstone network (2) is not embedded in N .
O
A
B
D
e1
e2
e4
e5
e3
Figure 2. The Wheatstone network.
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4.4. Main Results. The following theorem establishes the necessary
conditions under which, for any interior prior belief, as long as the cost
functions satisfy simple prerequisites, our model of dynamic routing
with variable demand yields learning in the long run. Both strong and
weak learning may happen, depending on the support of the demand.
Theorem 8. Consider any demand distribution with unbounded sup-
port D. Under Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, weak learning occurs
for any set of unbounded cost functions if and only if N is series-
parallel.
The intuition behind the theorem is the following: in an SP network,
under Assumption 1, equilibrium loads are weakly increasing in the de-
mand mass. Costs being unbounded, for a high enough demand, every
edge will be used at equilibrium. If D is bounded, the demand may not
use the whole network, hence the public belief may be wrong on the
set of unused paths. Similarly, if D is a strict subset of R+, it can hap-
pen that some zero-measure intervals correspond to the demand levels
which would allow to distinguish between some states. We then show
that if the routing network is not SP then there exists an assignment
of costs and a prior belief such that weak learning does not occur.
Proposition 9. Under the conditions of Theorem 8, strong learning
occurs for any set of unbounded cost functions if and only if D = R+.
5. Proofs
Before proving Theorem 8, we require the following lemma.
Lemma 10. Suppose N is series-parallel and costs functions are un-
bounded. Then
∀µ ∈ ∆(Θ), ∃d∗(µ) ∈ R+, ∀d > d∗(µ), ∀e ∈ E, le(d, µ) > 0.
This lemma states that in any routing game with incomplete infor-
mation, if the routing network is SP and cost functions are unbounded,
then there exist some demand thresholds, which depend on the public
belief, such that for any mass above said thresholds, equilibrium flows
will spread across every edge in the network. This is a consequence
of ?? who prove that in SP networks, there exists an equilibrium flow
whose loads are non-decreasing with respect to the demand. The full
proof is in the appendix.
We first prove the “if” part of the theorem. For any two states two
states θ, θ′ ∈ Θ and any edge e ∈ E, we define
(5.1) Le(θ, θ
′) = {l ≥ 0: ce(l, θ) 6= ce(l, θ
′)} .
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By Assumption 2, we know that for any pair of states, there exists
at least one edge for which this set is non-empty. By continuity and
monotonicity of the cost functions, we know also that if Le(θ, θ
′) is
non-empty, it is a countable union of disjoint open intervals. Now, we
define Deµ(θ, θ
′) as the set of demand masses such that, under a fixed
public belief µ, the load on e belongs to Le(θ, θ
′). Formally,
(5.2) Deµ(θ, θ
′) = {d ∈ R+ : le(d, µ) ∈ Le(θ, θ
′)} .
Finally, we define the set Dµ(θ, θ
′) as follows:
(5.3) Dµ(θ, θ
′) = ∪e∈ED
e
µ(θ, θ
′).
For any belief µ, Dµ(θ, θ
′) is the set of demands whose equilibrium costs
are different under states θ and θ′. Finally, let
(5.4) M = {M ⊆ Θ|P(supp(µ∞) = M) > 0} .
Given a prior belief and a demand distribution, M corresponds to
the set of possible supports for the limit belief. For each E ⊆ Θ, let
µE(θ) = µ0(θ)/µ0(E) be the probability distribution derived from µ0
by conditioning on the subset E of states.
Claim 11. For every M in M and every pair of states θ 6= θ′,
{θ, θ′} ⊂ M ⇒ P (Dθ,θ′(µM)) = 0.
Conversely, if there exists some time t such that, for every pair θ 6= θ′ in
the support of µt, P (Dθ,θ′(µt)) = 0, then supp(µt) ∈M and µ∞ = µt.
Proof. The last part of the statement is straightforward: if the belief
reaches a support such that no demand allows the distinction between
any two points in its support, then no additional information will be
aggregated and the belief will remain constant. To establish the first
part of the claim, let
A = {ω ∈ Ω : ∃θ 6= θ′, θ(ω) = θ, θ′ ∈ supp(µ∞)},(5.5)
that is,
A = {ω ∈ Ω : ∃θ 6= θ′, θ(ω) = θ, ∀t ≥ 0, dt /∈ Dθ,θ′(µt)}.(5.6)
By union bound,
P(A) ≤
∑
θ
∑
θ′ 6=θ
P({θ(ω) = θ, ∀t ≥ 0, dt /∈ Dθ,θ′(µt)})(5.7)
=
∑
θ
∑
θ′ 6=θ
µ0(θ)Pθ(∀t ≥ 0, dt /∈ Dθ,θ′(µt)}).(5.8)
Fix a pair θ 6= θ′. We have that
Pθ (∀t ≥ 0, dt /∈ Dθ,θ′(µt)) = Pθ (∩t≥0Bt) ,
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where Bt = {dt /∈ Dθ,θ′(µt)}.
Pθ (∩t≥0Bt) =
∏
t≥0
Pθ(Bt|B0, . . . , Bt−1)
Now, since Θ is finite,
Pθ(dt /∈ Dθ,θ′(µt) | B1, . . . , Bt−1)
=
∑
E⊆Θ
Pθ(µt = µE | B1, . . . , Bt−1)Pθ(dt /∈ Dθ,θ′(µt)|µt = µ,B1, . . . , Bt−1)
=
∑
E⊆Θ
Pθ(µt = µE | B1, . . . , Bt−1)Pθ(dt /∈ Dθ,θ′(µE)),
where the second equality follows from (dt)t being i.i.d.. Now, suppose
that there exists M ∈M with θ, θ′ ∈M and such that P (Dθ,θ′(µM)) >
0. Then there exists δ > 0 and ǫ > 0 such that
Pθ(µt = µM |B1, . . . , Bt−1) > δ
and
Pθ(dt ∈ Dθ,θ′(µM)) > ǫ.
Hence∑
E⊆supp(µ0)
Pθ(µt = µE | B1, . . . , Bt−1)Pθ(dt /∈ Dθ,θ′(µE)) < 1− δǫ < 1.
Thus, we have that
Pθ (∩t≥0Bt) = 0.

This establishes our first claim. This first result implies that for every
dynamic routing game with incomplete information, if two different
states belong to the support of the limit belief, then no demand mass
in D allows distinguishing between those two states. In particular, it
means that for every demand mass d, any equilibrium flow generates
identical costs in all states in the support of µ∞. We combine this with
Lemma 10 to prove the first part of Theorem 8 which we recall in the
following claim.
Claim 12. Suppose that the support D of the demand and cost func-
tions are unbounded and realized costs are perfectly observed on each
edge. If N is series-parallel, then weak learning occurs P-almost surely.
Proof. Recall that by definition, weak learning requires the demand to
be routed as in full information, although the public belief may put a
strictly positive probability on more that one state. From Claim 11,
we know that without any assumption, the demand is routed as under
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full information on the subgraph restricted to the support of the equi-
librium flow. Indeed, for any pair θ 6= θ′ in the support of µ∞, we have
that P (Dθ,θ′(µ∞)) = 0, meaning that for any demand mass d and any
edge e with positive load,
ce(l(d, µ∞), θ) = ce(l(d, µ∞), θ
′).
As the true state always belongs to the support of µ∞, all flows on
the restriction of N to the support of x are the same as under full
information. What may happen, though, is that there exist paths
which would be used under full information but are not with belief µ∞,
as is the case in the example in Section 3. Lemma 10 establishes the
conditions under which this situation cannot happen. If cost functions
are unbounded and N is SP, we know that there exists a demand
threshold d∗ such that any demand mass above d∗ will induce a positive
load on every edge at equilibrium. If the support D of the demand is
unbounded, it means by definition and by independence of the (dt)
that:
∀t ≥ 0, ∀M ∈ R+,P (dt > M) > 0.
In particular
∀t ≥ 0,P (dt > d
∗) > 0.
This implies that ∑
t≥0
P (dt > d
∗) = +∞,
which, by independence of the (dt) and Borel-Cantelli lemma, implies
that the event {dt > d∗} happens infinitely often. 
We now prove the only if part of the theorem, which we sum up in
the following claim.
Claim 13. Suppose that N does not belong to the class of series-parallel
graphs. Then, for every demand distribution F with unbounded support,
there exists a combination of cost functions that satisfy Assumption 1
and Assumption 2 and a prior belief µ0 ∈ ∆(θ) such that weak-learning
does not occur.
Proof. Consider a non-SP network N . By Proposition 5, this implies
that there is a Wheastone sub-network embedded in N . We start
by showing that for the network displayed in Fig. 2, there exists a
combination of costs and a prior belief such that weak learning does
not occur. Let c1, . . . , c5 be the costs of edges e1, . . . , e5 respectively.
Let Θ be binary with states θ1 and θ2, ǫ > 0, a ≥ 0. and consider the
following costs:
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c1(l, ·) = l; c3(l, θ1) = ǫl;
c2(l, ·) = 1 + ǫl; c3(l, θ2) = a + ǫl;
c4(l, ·) = 1 + ǫl;
c5(l, ·) = l;
There will be a positive load l3 on e3 if 1 − l3 ≥ aµ0(θ2). By choos-
ing any pair (a, µ0(θ2)) such that aµ0(θ2) > 1, for any value of the
demand, no flow will use the edge e3 at equilibrium. Yet, in state θ1,
for small values of the demand, under full information the whole routes
through edge e3, hence weak learning does not occur, independently of
the demand distribution.
We complete the proof constructively, according to the embedding
steps described in Definition 7 as follows:
(1) If an edge is divided into two edges with a single common node,
we update the costs such that, in each state, each new edge will
have a cost of half the original cost. Thus, equilibrium loads
will remain unchanged.
(2) If an edge is added, it is assigned a cost c(l, θ) = l independent
of the state. Furthermore, if any path from the origin to the
destination containing this edge also contains some edges con-
tained in a path from node A to node B, we multiply the cost of
those edges by a factor equal to the number of edges contained
in the shortest path from A to B. This guarantees that ay edge
connecting A to B will not be used at equilibrium.
(3) If either the origin or the destination is extended by an edge, it
is assigned a cost c(l, θ) = l.
This construction ensures that any edge between nodes A and B
will never receive any load for any value of the demand, hence weak
learning never occurs. 
The proof of Proposition 9 is a direct consequence of the proof of
Theorem 8: if D = R+, then equilibrium loads are continuous surjec-
tions, which guarantees strong learning. The full proof features in the
appendix. One may note that, for a given set of cost functions, it may
not be necessary that D is unbounded to ensure learning. For instance,
the example in Section 3 only requires a demand set D containing an
element strictly greater than a. But Theorem 8 applies irrespective
of the nature of cost functions. What we require instead is that each
edge receives a positive equilibrium load for some values of the demand,
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which Lemma 10 ensures. For this to hold for any set of cost functions,
it is necessary that D is unbounded2.
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Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 10. Assume by contradiction that there exists a
nonatomic routing game with incomplete information where cost func-
tions are unbounded and such that there exists at least one edge which
is never used at equilibrium, irrespective of the demand mass, given
some fixed belief µ, that is,
∃e ∈ E, ∃µ ∈ ∆(Θ), ∀d ∈ R, le(d, µ) = 0.
Let Re be the set of paths containing e. The above statement implies
that, for any r ∈ Re and any demand mass d, xr(d, µ) = 0. This means,
by definition of a Bayes-Wardrop equilibrium, that any path containing
e has an expected cost strictly larger than any other path r′ /∈ Re in the
support of x under the belief µ. In other words, for any path r ∈ Re
and r′ in the support of the equilibrium flow x,
(.9) Eµ(cr(x(d, µ), θ)) ≥ Eµ(cr′(x(d, µ), θ))
with cr(x(d, µ), θ) =
∑
e∈r ce(le(d, µ)).
To prove that this is a contradiction, we exploit the SP architecture
through an intermediate result. As stated above, one characteristic
property of SP networks is the existence of a flow profile with weakly
increasing equilibrium loads with respect to the total demand mass.
This result features in [7] under full information. We apply it to the
game played with the expected costs under the belief µ.
Proposition 14 ([7]). Let N be a finite series-parallel network. Un-
der Assumption 1, for any belief µ ∈ ∆(Θ) and any edge e ∈ E, the
equilibrium load le(·, µ) is a non-decreasing function of the demand.
Authors prove the existence of such a flow profile using the construc-
tive definition of SP graphs. Under Assumption 1, we have unicity
of the equilibrium loads given the demand mass which completes the
proof. We then complete the proof of Lemma 10 by induction on the
number of series-parallel operations which define the network.
Consider a graph with an origin and a destination connected by a
single edge e. Then, it is trivial that for any belief µ ∈ ∆(Θ), if d > 0
then le(d, µ) > 0.
Now consider two graphs N1 and N2 such that for any belief µ ∈
∆(Θ), there exist demand thresholds d∗1 and d
∗
2 such that for any d > d
∗
1
every edge in N1 has a positive load at equilibrium and similarly, for
any d > d∗2 every edge in N2 has a positive load at equilibrium.
If a graph N is the result of connecting N1 and N2 in series, as the
demand entering N2 is the demand exiting N1, it is immediate that for
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any demand d > max(d∗1, d
∗
2), every edge in N will have a positive load
at equilibrium.
If a graphN is the result of connectingN1 andN2 in parallel, then an
equilibrium load profile l(d, µ) inN splits as a pair (l1(d1(d), µ), l2(d2(d), µ))
such that l1(d1(d), µ) is an equilibrium load profile for N1, l2(d2(d), µ)
is an equilibrium load profile for N2 and d1(d)+d2(d) = d. As shown in
[7], d1(d) and d2(d) are non-decreasing functions of d. Assume by con-
tradiction that for every d, N1 contains an edge e which is not used in
ay equilibrium, then d1(d) is bounded above by some real value d¯ < d
∗
1.
Then, one has that limd→∞ d2(d) =∞, which implies that either costs
in N1 are constant and equal to +∞, or that costs in N2 are bounded.
Those two consequences contradict the initial hypothesis, hence there
exists some demand threshold d∗ such that for ad d > d∗, every edge
in N will be used at equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 9. Finally, we prove Proposition 9 as a conse-
quence of the proof of Theorem 8.
Proof. If D = R+, by Lemma 10 and Proposition 14, for any edge e
and any belief µ, the equilibrium load le(., µ) on e is a monotone and
continuous surjection from R+ to itself. In particular, as for any e the
sets Le(θ, θ
′) are countable union of disjoint open intervals, it implies
that the sets Deθ,θ′(µ) – and Dθ,θ′(µ) – are countable union of disjoint
open intervals themselves. Furthermore, by Assumption 2, there exists
at least one edge e for which Deθ,θ′(µ) 6= ∅.
We then have that for every belief µ and every two states θ 6= θ′,
P(Dθ,θ′(µ)) =
∫
R+
1 (Dθ,θ′(µ)) dF > 0.
From Claim 11 and its proof, it follows that for any M ∈M, M must
be a singleton. To conclude, observe that any M contains θ˜(ω).
Conversely, if D is a strict subset, there exists an assignment of
cost functions such that strong learning never occurs. Indeed, on an
arbitrary edge in the network and two states θ and θ′ in Θ, assign any
two cost functions that differ on R+ \ D only. Then, although weak
learning will occur with probability 1, any M ∈ M will contain both
θ and θ′. 
